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New Rules for 
Zoning Adult Uses: 
The Supreme Court's 
Renton Decision 
By Alan Weinstein 
This term, for the third time in 10 years, the U.S. Supreme 
Court considered the validity of zoning that restricts the loca­
tion or operation of businesses that trade in sexually oriented 
books, magazines, movies, or entertainment. Restrictions on 
such "adult businesses" raise serious constitutional issues 
because the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech 
extends to sexually oriented media so long as the material is not 
considered obscene. In the latest case, City of Renton v. 
Playtime Theatres, 106 S.Ct. 925 (1986), 38 ZD 258, the Court 
upheld a zoning ordinance that limited the location of theaters 
exhibiting adult movies to a 520-acre area in one corner of the 
city. This ruling provides new guidance to courts called on to 
review zoning that regulates adult businesses and marks a sig­
nificant departure from the rules in the large number of such 
cases decided since the Supreme Court first approved adult­
business zoning in its 1976 decision in Young v. American Mini 
Theatres, 427 U.S. SO (1976), 28 ZD 329. 
Mini Theatres involved a challenge to the legality of Detroit's 
"anti-Skid Row" ordinance that singled out adult bookstores 
and theaters for special regulatory treatment. The Detroit or­
dinance provided, inter alia, that adult theaters and bookstores 
may not be located within 500 feet of a residential area or within 
1,000 feet of any two other regulated uses defined as: adult 
bookstores, adult theaters and minitheaters, bars, cabarets, 
hotels and motels, pawnshops, billiard and pool halls, public 
lodging houses, secondhand stores, shoeshine parlors, and taxi 
dance halls. Detroit Ordinance 742-G (Nov. 2, 1972), amend­
ing Official Zoning Ordinance of the City of Detroit Secs. 
32.007, 66.0000, 66.0101 (1962). A sharply divided Supreme 
Court upheld the ordinance. Justice Stevens's plurality opinion 
concluded that the ordinance had only a minimal and incidental 
effect on public access to adult entertainment, but noted that 
the decision might be quite different if "the ordinance had the 
effect of suppressing or greatly restricting access to lawful 
speech."1 The Detroit scheme raised significant First Amend­
ment issues because its distinctions were based on the content 
of the material exhibited or sold and because it arguably in­
fringed on free speech rights. Justice Stevens's opinion stressed 
two factors that insulated the ordinance from constitutional at­
tack. First, Detroit's effort to regulate protected forms of expres­
sion apparently was motivated by a desire to avoid the 
neighborhood blight caused by a concentration of adult uses 
and not by a distaste for the content of the speech itself. Second, 
the ordinance would not have the effect of restricting the 
market for adult entertainment. 
Alan Weinstein is an attorney, city planner, and professor of law at the Jacob 
D. Fuchs berg Law Center, Touro College School of Law, in Huntington, New 
York. 
1. 427U.S. so, 71. 
In the wake of the Mini Theatres decision, many 
municipalities adopted the Detroit dispersion technique to ad­
dress the problems they claimed they were experiencing with 
the negative effects adult businesses can have on 
neighborhoods. While many of these ordinances were valid, 
court challenges to several dispersion schemes revealed that 
some cities either could not produce legislative findings 
supporting their restrictions or adopted ordinances that had the 
effect of banning or severely restricting access to adult enter­
tainment. Not surprisingly, these ordinances were struck down 
as violative of the First Amendment. For example, in Alexander 
v. City ofMinneapolis, 698 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1983), the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated an ordinance that reduced 
permissible locations for adult businesses by two-thirds. 
In 1981, the Supreme Court considered a different form of 
restriction on adult entertainment in Schad v. Borough of 
Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981), 33 ZD 254. The Mount 
Ephraim ordinance achieved its goal of banning nude danc­
ing by prohibiting all live entertainment in the community. A 
sharply divided Court held that the ordinance, by banning all 
live entertainment, was invalid because it intruded too far on 
rights protected by the First Amendment. An interesting as­
pect of the Schad case was Mount Ephraim's argument that it 
need not allow live entertainment generally, and nude danc­
ing in particular, within its boundaries if such adult entertain­
ment is readily available in nearby communities. The Court 
rejected this position, finding that the right to freedom of ex­
pression in any one locale may not be abridged simply because 
the right to the expression may be exercised in some other 
place. 
In a previous commentary, "Regulating Pornography: Re­
cent Legal Trends," 34 Land Use Law & Zoning Digest, No. 
2 at 4 (1982), this author concluded that the "zoning cases in­
volving restrictions on adult businesses with First Amendment 
protection-such as theaters and bookstores-show a clear 
pattern of judicial concern with maintaining community ac­
cess to such businesses." That commentary also identified four 
rules that appeared to be guiding the courts' decisions: loca­
tional restrictions on adult businesses would be upheld only 
if the market for this commodity is essentially unrestrained; 
vaguely worded ordinances were unacceptable; ordinances 
that do not develop a factual basis for their restrictions or do 
not relate those restrictions directly to recognized zoning pur­
poses will be struck down; and, ordinances that grant govern­
ment officials too-broad discretionary powers to determine 
whether or not an adult business will be permitted to 
operate-for example, by provisions for special permits-will 
be struck down. 
The Renton case makes significant changes in two of these 
rules, allowing local governments more freedom when they 
regulate adult businesses. Renton is silent on other rules, how­
ever, and the ultimate effect of the case depends in large part 
on how lower courts apply the new rulings to specific cases. 
The remainder of this commentary discusses the Renton case 
and explores the implications it holds for adult-business zon­
ing in light of other recent state and federal court decisions. 
THE RENTON DECISION 
The controversy that gave rise to the Renton case began in 
May 1980, when the mayor of Renton, a Seattle suburb, re­
quested that the city council consider enacting adult-business 
legislation. At the time, there were no adult businesses in that 
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city of 32, 000. The city council referred the matter to the city's 
Planning and Development Committee, which held public 
hearings, reviewed the experience of Seattle and other cities, 
and sought the advice of the city attorney. The city council 
also enacted a moratorium on the licensing of adult businesses, 
explaining its action on the grounds that such businesses 
"would have a severe impact upon surrounding businesses and 
residences. "2 
In April 1981, the city council enacted an ordinance based 
on the committee's recommendation. The ordinance 
originally prohibited adult theaters from locating within 1,000 
feet of any residential zone or dwelling, any church, 
synagogue, or other religious institution, or any park, and 
also from locating within one mile of any public or private 
school. It was later amended to reduce the locational restric­
tion regarding schools from one mile to 1,000 feet. In effect, 
the ordinance restricted the location of adult theaters to a 520­
acre area. At the time, there were no theaters located in the 
520-acre area, and none of the theaters outside that area were 
exhibiting adult films. In January 1982, Playtime Theatres ac­
quired two movie theaters in Renton with the intention of ex­
hibiting adult films at one of them. Playtime then sued in 
federal district court, challenging the ordinance. 
On January 11, 1983, the district court judge adopted a 
federal magistrate's findings that: the ordinance "for all prac­
tical purposes excludes adult theaters from the city"; Renton 
had not established a factual basis for the adoption of the or­
dinance; and, the motivation behind the ordinance reflected 
·'simple distaste for adult theaters because of the content of the 
films shown." 
Playtime was granted a preliminary injunction barring en­
forcement of the ordinance and, as a result, began to exhibit 
adult movies. But in February, the district court vacated the 
preliminary injunction and denied Playtime a permanent in­
junction, thus reinstating the ordinance. The court, departing 
from the magistrate's findings, found that 520 acres were 
available for the location of adult theaters and that the or­
dinance did not impermissibly restrict Playtime's First 
Amendment rights. The court also found no improper motive 
behind enactment of the ordinance and ruled that Renton 
could rely on the experiences of other cities in its legislative 
findings supporting the ordinance. Renton appealed. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district 
court in a 1984 decision, Playtime Theatres v. City ofRenton, 
748F.2d527(9th Cir.1984), 37 ZD115. Although the appeals 
court accepted the district court's finding that 520 acres re­
mained outside the ordinance's locational restrictions, it did 
not agree that the land was "available" for adult theaters. 
Noting that a substantial part of the 520 acres was occupied 
by a sewage treatment plant, a horseracing track, an industrial 
park, warehouse and manufacturing facilities, an oil tank 
farm, and a fully developed shopping center, the Ninth Cir­
cuit found that limiting adult theaters to these areas was a 
substantial restriction on speech. Thus, the Renton ordinance 
stood on a different footing from the Detroit ordinance ap­
proved in Mini Theatres, which did not have the effect of 
restricting the number of adult theaters. 
The appeals court examined the Renton ordinance under 
the four-part test developed in United States v. O'Brien, 391 
U.S. 367 (1968), to determine the validity of a regulation that 
affects freedom of expression. Under this test, a regulation is 
2. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 106S.Ct. 925, 927(1986), 38ZD 
258. 
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constitutional only if: it is within the constitutional power of 
the government; it furthers an important or substantial gov­
ernmental interest; the governmental interest is unrelated to 
the suppression of speech; and the incidental restriction on 
First Amendment freedom is no greater than essential to fur­
ther that interest. Applying these factors to the challenged or­
dinance, the court found two problems: Renton had not 
demonstrated a substantial governmental interest and had not 
proved that the ordinance was unrelated to the suppression of 
speech. The Ninth Circuit noted that both the federal 
magistrate and the district court recognized that many of the 
reasons Renton offered for its ordinance ''were no more than 
expressions of dislike for the subject matter. "3 On these facts, 
the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to 
determine whether Renton could prove that suppression of 
speech was not a motivating factor in its adoption of the 
ordinance. 
The Supreme Court overruled the Ninth Circuit in a deci­
sion that saw only Justices Brennan and Marshall dissenting. 
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion found this case essen­
tially similar to Mini Theatres as a form of content-neutral 
time, place, and manner regulation.4 While the ordinance 
singled out adult theaters for separate zoning treatment, Rehn­
quist argued that the ordinance was aimed "not at the content 
of the films shown, but at the secondary effects of such theaters 
on the surrounding community." Thus, he found that "the 
Renton ordinance is completely consistent with our definition 
of 'content-neutral' speech regulations as those that 'are 
justified without reference to the content of the regulated 
speech."' This line of reasoning brought the case squarely 
within the precedent created in Mini Theatres. 
The test for such an ordinance, according to the majority, 
has two parts: Does the ordinance serve a substantial govern­
mental interest, and does it allow for reasonable alternative 
means of communication? The major issue in the first prong 
of this inquiry was whether the city of Renton was justified in 
relying on the experiences of other cities in finding that adult 
theaters pose a serious threat of urban deterioration. The 
Ninth Circuit had ruled that, because the ordinance was 
enacted without the benefit of studies specifically relating to 
the "particular problems or needs of Renton," the city's 
justifications for the ordinance were "conclusory and 
speculative." The majority rejected this approach as impos­
ing "an unnecessarily rigid burden of proof." Noting that Ren­
ton had considered the"detailed findings" regarding the effects 
of adult theaters in neighboring Seattle, the majority held that 
"Renton was entitled to rely on the experiences of Seattle and 
other cities." The majority also provided guidance for other 
municipalities seeking to rely on the experience of other cities: 
''The First Amendment does not require a city, before enact­
ing such an ordinance, to conduct new studies or produce 
evidence independent of that already generated by other cities, 
so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably 
believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses."5 
3. 748 F .2d at 537-538. 
4. In general, government may place reasonable restrictions on the time, 
place, or manner in which speech takes place so long as the restrictions are 
not related to the content of the speech. 
5. 106 S.Ct. at 931. Renton had relied extensively on the summary of the 
"detailed findings" of Seattle's study of the effects of adult movie theaters that 
appeared in the Washington Supreme Court's opinion in Northend Cinema 




After dismissing claims that the Renton ordinance was 
flawed because it chose to concentrate the location of theaters, 
rather than disperse them as had Detroit, and was 
underinclusive because it chose to regulate only adult theaters 
and not the other kinds of adult businesses that are likely to pro­
duce secondary effects, the majority addressed the second 
prong of its test: whether the Renton ordinance allows for 
reasonable alternative avenues of communication. There was 
no question that the ordinance permitted adult theaters to 
locate within a 520-acre portion of the city, but there was a 
dispute over whether there were "commercially viable" sites 
available for adult theaters within this restricted area. The 
Ninth Circuit had found there were none and thus held that the 
Renton ordinance "would result in a substantial restriction on 
speech." 
The majority rejected the Ninth Circuit's conclusion, relying 
instead on the district court's finding that the 520 acres of land 
consist of "[a]mple, accessible real estate," including "acreage 
in all stages of development from raw land to developed, in­
dustrial, warehouse, office, and shopping space that is criss­
crossed by freeways, highways, and roads." Since land and 
buildings were "ample" and "accessible," the majority argued 
that Renton had not effectively denied the adult-theater 
operators "a reasonable opportunity to open and operate an 
adult theater within the city." 
Adult-theater operators, the majority said, ''must fend for 
themselves in the real estate market, on an equal footing with 
other prospective purchasers and lessees.... [W]e have 
never suggested that the First Amendment compels the govern­
ment to ensure that adult theaters, or any other kinds of speech­
related businesses for that matter, will be able to obtain sites at 
bargain prices." The majority thus concluded that the Renton 
ordinance represents a valid governmental response to the 
serious problems created by adult theaters and that the city had 
not used the "power to zone as a pretext for suppressing 
expression." 
Justice Brennan's dissent, joined by Justice Marshall, labeled 
the majority's analysis ''misguided." Brennan attacked the argu­
ment that the Renton ordinance was aimed at the secondary ef­
fects of the adult theaters and not at the content of the films 
shown there. For Brennan, the fact that the ordinance imposed 
"special restrictions on certain kinds of speech on the basis of 
content" belied Renton' s claim that the ordinance was not 
designed to suppress the content of adult movies. Not only did 
the ordinance discriminate on its face against adult theaters, 
but, Brennan claimed, the circumstances surrounding the adop­
tion and amendment of the ordinance strongly suggested that 
the ordinance was designed to suppress expression. Among 
these circumstances were that: the "findings" that support the 
ordinance were adopted only after the commencement of this 
lawsuit; the "findings" were based primarily' on the experiences 
of other cities; the city council conducted no studies and heard 
no expert testimony on how the community would be affected 
by the presence of an adult movie theater; and a number of 
these "findings" did not relate to legitimate land use concerns, 
but were no more than expressions of dislike for the subject 
matter shown at adult theaters.6 
6. Brennan cited the following findings of the city council as examples of 
"expressions of dislike for the subject matter": 
Location of adult entertainment land uses on the main commercial thoroughfares 
of the city gives an impression of legitimacy to, and causes a loss of sensitivity to, 
the adverse effect of pornography upon children, established family relations, 
Based on the above, Brennan concluded that the Renton or­
dinance was designed to suppress expression and thus was not 
to be analyzed as a content-neutral time, place, and manner 
restriction. Viewed as a content-based restriction on speech, 
the ordinance is constitutional, he argued, only if the city can 
show that the ordinance is a precisely drawn means of serv­
ing a compelling governmental interest. Applying this stan­
dard to the facts of this case, Brennan found the ordinance 
unconstitutional because Renton had not shown that locating 
adult theaters near its churches, schools, and homes would 
necessarily result in undesirable "secondary effects'' or that 
these problems could not be effectively addressed by less in­
trusive restrictions. 
Brennan also found the ordinance unconstitutional even 
assuming that it should be analyzed as a content-neutral time, 
place, and manner restriction. Applying the majority's two­
prong test, Brennan found that the record justifying the city's 
asserted interest was insufficient to support that interest and 
that the ordinance did not provide for reasonable alternative 
avenues of communication. In particular, he claimed that the 
majority's argument that the ordinance did nothing more than 
require adult theater operators to participate in the real estate 
market like anyone else was mistakeri, pointing out that adult 
theater operators were not being treated the same as others, 
since they were required to conduct business under severe 
restrictions not imposed on others. In short, while other 
businesses seeking to locate in the 520-acre area could likely 
go elsewhere if economics demanded, the adult-theater 
operators could not. 
RENTON'S SIGNIFICANCE 
Renton is an important decision for a number of reasons. 
Primarily, it shows that a clear majority of the Supreme Court 
now accepts the plurality's argument in Mini Theatres that 
zoning ordinances may single out adult businesses for 
regulatory treatment different from that accorded other types 
of businesses, despite the fact that adult businesses are pro­
tected by the First Amendment. Justice Rehnquist's opinion 
found that the Renton ordinance was a valid content-neutral 
time, place, and manner restriction because the ordinance was 
aimed ·'not at the content of the films shown, but at the 
secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding commu­
nity." By placing adult-business zoning squarely in the cate­
gory of time, place, and manner regulation, the majority 
directs courts to apply Renton 's relatively lenient standard of 
review to judge the validity of such ordinances, rather than the 
more demanding O'Brien test. The opinion also makes clear 
that both dispersion and concentration are constitutionally 
valid strategies for addressing the problems of adult 
businesses. Since Mini Theatres dealt only with a dispersion 
ordinance, this is the first Supreme Court pronouncement on 
concentration of adult uses, a technique used in Boston and 
Seattle, among other cities. Local governments may now 
safely adopt either a concentration or dispersion approach to 
regulating adult businesses. 
To explore the likely effects of the Renton decision in more 
detail, it will be helpful to refer again to the four "rules" that 
respect for the marital relationship and for the sanctity of marriage relations of 
others, and the concept of nonaggressive, consensual sexual relations. 
Location of adult land uses in close proximity to residential uses, churches, parks, 
and other public facilities, and schools, will cause a degradation of the community 
standards of morality. Pornographic material has a degrading effect upon the rela­
tionship between spouses. 106 S.Ct. at 935, n. 3. 
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appeared to guide the courts in the years after the Mini 
Theatres opinion. The Renton case addresses two of these 
directly: the effect of zoning on the number of ad.ult busi­
nesses and the development of findings of fact to support the 
ordinances. 
Availability of Locations 
Mini Theatres required that the market for adult entertain­
ment remain "essentially unrestrained" after the enactment of 
adult-business zoning. The Detroit ordinance passed this test 
because the Court found that the dispersion scheme, while 
prohibiting adult businesses from certain locations, would not 
have the effect of diminishing the number of adult businesses 
that could operate in the city. When other cities attempted to 
use the dispersion technique to severely restrict or effectively 
ban adult businesses, however, the lower courts were not hesi­
tant to invalidate the offending ordinances. 
In Basiardnes v. City ofGalveston, 682 F .2d 1203 (5th Cir. 
1982), 35 ZD 66, for example, a federal appeals court over­
turned an adult-business ordinance because the locational 
restrictions were so severe that adult businesses could operate 
only under "oppressive" conditions. The court found that 
adult businesses were banned in 85 to 90 percent of the city, 
while the remaining areas where adult businesses could locate 
were unsuited for such uses. Adult businesses were permitted 
only in industrial zones that were distant from other shopping 
and entertainment areas and that contained only warehouses, 
shipyards, undeveloped areas, and swamps. These areas had 
few roads and were "poorly lit, barren of structures suitable for 
showing films, and perhaps unsafe." Based on these find­
ings, the court concluded that the areas were available for 
adult businesses only in theory, "but in fact they were com­
pletely unsuited to this use."7 Since the ordinance's loca­
tional restrictions could readily have the effect of re_ducing the 
number of adult businesses, the court struck it down. 
In another case, Purple Onion v. Jackson, 511F.Supp.1207 
(N.D. Ga. 1981), 34 ZD 7, a federal court struck down 
Atlanta's adult business ordinance after determining that the 
locational restrictions of the ordinance were so severe that 
they would significantly reduce, and possibly eliminate 
altogether, public access to adult entertainment. The Atlanta 
ordinance was based on the dispersion scheme used in Detroit, 
but extended it by restricting all new adult businesses to three 
zoning districts and including an amortization provision re­
quiring that certain existing adult businesses cease operating 
at their current locations. The city contended that there were 
enough sites available in the three zoning districts to ensure 
that access to adult businesses would not be restricted. The 
court refused to defer to the city's assessment and, after 
carefully reviewing all the maps, documentary evidence, 
photographs, and testimony regarding site availability, found 
that no more than three or four sites in the restricted area 
would be considered by a "reasonably prudent investor" as a 
possible site for an adult business. Based on these findings, the 
court ruled that the restrictions would reduce public access to 
adult businesses and struck down the ordinance. 
The court found sites unacceptable for a number of reasons: 
the size and shape of lots precluded construction of a building; 
there was no road access; surrounding noxious uses, such as 
oil storage tanks and a sewage treatment plant, were incom­
patible; and the present ownership or use of the site made its 
7. 682F.2dat1214. 
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sale or lease for use as a adult business unlikely. In making 
these findings, however, the court did not consider either the 
price of the land or whether the land was presently for sale. 
The majority opinion in Renton rejects the approach seen 
in Basiardnes and Purple Onion. In Renton, there was a con­
flicting factual record on the effect of the restrictions on site 
availability. The federal magistrate's finding that the or­
dinance effectively excluded adult businesses was ultimately 
rejected by the district court. On appeal, however, the Ninth 
Circuit found that a substantial part of the 520 acres was oc­
cupied by uses incompatible with adult theaters-including 
a sewage treatment plant, an oil tank farm, a racetrack, and 
a fully developed shopping center-and concluded that this 
seriously limited the sites available for adult theaters. Justice 
Rehnquist argued that, since land and buildings were "ample'' 
and "accessible," the ordinance was not overly restrictive: 
'The First Amendment requires only that Renton refrain from 
effectively denying respondents a reasonable opportunity to 
open and operate an adult theater within the city." Adult 
theaters have to compete in the real estate market like anyone 
else, Rehnquist stated, and the Court has "never suggested that 
the First Amendment compels the government to ensure that 
adult theaters, or any other kinds of speech-related businesses 
for that matter, will be able to obtain sites at bargain 
prices."8 Justice Brennan's dissent challenged this line of 
reasoning, arguing that adult theaters were clearly not able to 
compete in the real estate market on equal footing with the 
others because they alone were restricted to sites in the 520­
acre area reserved for adult businesses. 
The majority opinion means that cities may restrict the loca­
tion of adult businesses providing the restrictions allow such 
businesses a "reasonable opportunity" to operate. While such 
language can be read as granting courts a great deal of leeway 
in deciding individual cases-reasonableness, after all, is not 
a term subject to precise definition-the tone of the opinion 
calls for less stringent judicial review of the probable effect of 
restrictions on adult businesses. Based on the facts in Renton, 
for example, such factors as incompatible neighboring uses, 
lack of existing suitable structures, and distance from 
established retail and commercial districts are irrelevant so 
long as the restricted area contains sufficient vacant or devel­
oped land, is accessible by road, and presumably is eligible for 
utility services. 
At minimum, Renton places the burden of proof on those 
challenging an adult-business ordinance to prove that its loca­
tional restrictions preclude a "reasonable opportunity" to 
operate in that -community. If a party challenging an or­
dinance can make a strong, uncontradicted factual showing 
that the restrictions severely restrict or effectively prohibit 
adult businesses from operating, the Renton decision clearly 
empowers a court to invalidate the ordinance. What is troubl­
ing about the decision, however, is that it may encourage cities 
to play a game of "chicken" with the courts to see how far adult 
businesses may be restricted before a court objects. Unfor­
tunately, the goal is to use zoning impermissibly as a technique 
for eliminating adult businesses, and, because reasonableness 
is such an elusive term, the Renton decision has made that 
easier. 
Studies from Other Communities 
Mini Theatres also sought to guard against ordinances that are 
8. 106 S.Ct. at 932. 
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motivated by a distaste for constitutionally protected forms 
of expression by requiring that communities demonstrate the 
adverse effects on neighborhoods associated with adult 
businesses and narrowly tailor their restrictions to further the 
specific governmental interests endangered by the presence of 
such businesses. In a number of subsequent cases, courts 
struck down ordinances in part because the city had not de­
veloped an adequate factual record or had relied on the find­
ings of other communities rather than conducting its own 
studies. For example, in CLR Corp. v. Henline, 520 F.Supp. 
760(W.D. Mich.1981), 34ZD59, aff'd702F.2d637(6th Cir. 
1983), the federal trial court invalidated an adult-use or­
dinance partially on the absence of any legislative history or 
factual background for the ordinance, in spite of the city's 
claim that it could rely on the experience of Detroit and other 
cities. 
In Renton, the city relied on the factual findings and ex­
perience of Seattle and Detroit, rather than making any find­
ings of its own. The Ninth Circuit had ruled that, because the 
Renton ordinance was enacted without the benefit of studies 
specifically relating to "the particular problems or needs of 
Renton," the city's justifications for the ordinance were ''con­
clusory and speculative." Renton had presented a very thin 
record to support its enactment of the ordinance. To uphold 
the substantiality of Renton's governmental interest, the 
district court had to rely on Renton's recitation of the ex­
perience of other cities, particularly Detroit and Seattle. The 
Ninth Circuit found this reliance misplaced, ruling that Ren­
ton had not studied the effects of adult theaters and applied 
those findings to the specific problems of Renton. In par­
ticular, the Detroit experience, involving the problems raised 
by a concentration of adult uses, was irrelevant to Renton's 
stated interest in isolating adult theaters from residential 
districts and certain other uses. The appeals court stopped 
short of ruling that Renton could not use the experiences of 
other cities as part of its findings in support of the ordinance, 
but found that "in this case those experiences simply are not 
sufficient to sustain Renton' s burden of showing a significant 
governmental interest.'"' The majority rejected this argu­
ment, claiming that it imposed an "unnecessarily rigid burden 
of proof" on the city, and held that Renton was justified in 
relying on the experience of other cities. To guide courts in the 
future on this issue, the majority stated: "The First Amend­
ment does not require a city, before enacting such an or­
dinance, to conduct new studies or produce evidence 
independent of that already generated by other cities, so long 
as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably 
believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses." 
This "reasonable belief" standard for adopting another 
city's experience with adult businesses suffers from the same 
shortcomings as the "reasonable opportunity" standard 
discussed previously. The majority opinion provides only 
minimal guidance on how to administer the standard. Justice 
Rehnquist noted that, in this case, Seattle had shared Renton' s 
concern with preventing the secondary effects caused by the 
presence of even one adult theater in a given neighborhood, 
that Renton had relied heavily on the "detailed findings" de­
veloped by Seattle, and that it was irrelevant that Renton 
ultimately chose a different method of adult theater zoning 
than that chosen by Seattle. This suggests that cities may safely 
rely on the experience of other communities if the problems 
9. 74SF.2dat537. 
addressed in the two cities are similar and there are "detailed 
findings" about the effects of adult businesses. Courts will 
probably also require a city relying on another community's 
experience to offer some reasonable justification for doing so. 
This does not mean that a city is totally free to forego its own 
fact-finding, however. For example, a court would have lit­
tle trouble in striking down an ordinance that justified its 
regulation of a single adult bookstore by relying on the ex­
perience of Detroit with the negative effects of a concentration 
of adult businesses. 
Taken together, the two "reasonableness" standards for 
judging adult-business ordinances would seem to make it quite 
simple for many communities to make the operation of adult 
businesses difficult, it not impossible, even though they are 
purportedly protected by the First Amendment. Consider the 
following scenario. Centreville, a hypothetical small city of 
32,000, has no adult businesses. When city officials learn that 
one of the two theaters in the community may begin exhibiting 
adult movies, the city council enacts an adult-business or­
dinance. The ordinance recites the experience of Seattle with 
the negative effects that the presence of a single adult theater 
can have on a neighborhood and, based on a statement that 
city officials "reasonably believe" that experience relates to 
their situation, restricts the location of adult theaters to an iso­
lated comer of the community. The ordinance further recites 
that 520 acres are available for the location of adult theaters 
in the area, that the area is well-served by roads, and that both 
vacant land and developed buildings are "ample" and 
''available" there. The ordinance concludes that a "reasonable 
opportunity" exists in the area for the operation of an adult 
theater. 
This, of course, is the Renton case. What some may find 
troubling about this scenario is that it permits a city to treat 
two theater operators totally differently, depending entirely 
on the content of the movies they intend to exhibit. The Mini 
Theatres opinion granted communities the right to prevent the 
neighborhood blight caused by a concentration of adult 
businesses if they could show the problem existed in their com­
munity and if the restrictions they imposed did not lessen ac­
cess to this form of protected speech. Renton now effectively 
grants communities the power to ban the use of any existing 
theater for the exhibition of adult movies without any 
justification based on the conditions in that community and 
without any assurance that a new location would be commer­
cially viable. The decision is a boon to those opposed to adult 
business and a disaster for those concerned with unjustified 
government intrusion upon rights guaranteed by the First 
Amendment. 
OTHER ISSUES 
Although not an issue in the Renton case, amortization. pro­
visions warrant discussion at this point, since the courts' treat­
ment of such provisions may be affected by the decision. Most 
cities that have enacted adult-business ordinances have made 
the restrictions prospective only, allowing existing businesses 
to continue to operate as nonconforming uses.10 In the vast 
majority of states, however, there is no constitutional bar to 
requiring such nonconforming uses to cease operation or to 
relocate within a reasonable time limit. The general rule for 
10. See e.g., Texas National Theatres v. City of Albuquerque, 639 P.2d 
509 (N.M. 1982)(general rule is that nonconforming uses in existence at the 
time of amendment of the zoning ordinance may be continued). 
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determining the reasonableness of an amortization period is 
whether the probable benefit to the community from closing 
the business outweighs the hardship incurred by the operator 
from such a closing. Thus, for example, in Northend Cinema 
v. City ofSeattle, 585P.2d1153 (Wash. 1978), 31ZD 179, the 
Supreme Court of Washington upheld a Seattle adult-business 
zoning ordinance that had the effect of requiring the concen­
tration of adult uses and that included a provision terminating 
any nonconforming adult business within 90 days. The court 
found the 90-day amortization period reasonable as applied 
to a number of adult theaters because none of the theaters was 
bound by its lease to exhibit adult films nor were the theaters 
bound to remain at their existing locations. Accordingly, the 
court concluded that the public benefit from the termination 
of these uses outweighed the merely speculative harm asserted 
by the theater operators. Other courts have upheld amortiza­
tion provisions of varying lengths.11 
In cases where amortization provisions have been com­
bined with severe locational restrictions on adult businesses, 
however, the ordinances have been struck down. In Alex­
anderv. City ofMinneapolis, 698F.2d 936 (8th Cir.1983), for 
example, the court invalidated an ordinance that provided a 
three-month amortization period for adult businesses. The 
court found that over 30 adult businesses would have to be ter­
minated by the end of the amortization period, but, because 
of the severe locational restrictions in the ordinance, there 
were only a limited number of available sites left in the city to 
which these businesses could relocate. On these facts, the 
court found that the ordinance was an excessive restriction on 
constitutionally protected speech and invalidated it.12 
These cases suggest that the courts may treat ordinances em­
bodying locational restrictions modeled on the Renton case 
more harshly if they contain amortization provisions rather 
than allowing nonconforming uses to remain in operation. 
Courts may find it valid to restrict future adult businesses to 
areas where they have a "reasonable opportunity" to operate, 
but may well draw the line if, in addition, existing businesses 
are required to terminate their operation at existing sites. The 
greater the number of existing businesses affected by the or­
dinance, the more likely that it will be invalidated, despite the 
Supreme Court's decision in Renton. 
The Renton case left undisturbed the two remaining rules 
that could be derived from Mini Theatres and subsequent 
cases. First, courts have not hesitated to strike down or­
dinances that were vague or overbroad. Adult-business or­
dinances must show great precision in their language, 
particularly in the text of definitions and standards for deter­
11. See e.g., Hurt Bookstoresv. Edmisten, 612F.2d821 (4th Cir. 1979)(six 
months); Castner v. City of Oakland, 180 Cal.Rptr. 682 (Cal. App. 1982), 
34ZD172, (one-year amortization period for nonconforming uses that fail 
to obtain a conditional use permit, with additional one-year grace period for 
adult businesses that demonstrate economic hardship). 
12. SeealsoPurpleOnionv.Jackson, 511F.Supp.1207(N.D. Ga.1981), 
34ZD7. 
mining what is and what is not regulated. Ordinances that 
leave the subjects of regulation unclear or that use definitions 
so broad that uses other than adult businesses come within the 
regulations will be routinely invalidated. For example, in the 
Purple Onion case, the Atlanta ordinance defined "adult 
bookstore" and "adult movie theater" so loosely that, in the 
view of the court, the definitions could include the federal 
courthouse, a large number of private homes and apartments, 
and downtown hotels that offered adult movies on cable 
television in guest rooms.13 The court ruled that the defini­
tions were constitutionally impermissible because they were 
substantially overbroad. 
Renton also was silent on the issue of ordinances that create 
an unconstitutional prior restraint on freedom of expression. 
The prior restraint problem arises when ordinances grant gov­
ernment officials discretionary powers to determine whether 
an adult business will be permitted to operate. Typically, such 
ordinances use special permits or business-licensing re­
quirements that allow officials to grant or deny an adult busi­
ness permission to open. The courts have generally been quite 
hostile to such provisions. In County ofCook v. World Wide 
News Agency, 424N.E.2d1173 (Ill. 1981), 34ZD10, for ex­
ample, an amendment to the Cook County zoning ordinance 
made adult businesses special uses that required the issuance 
of a special use permit. The court struck down the ordinance 
as a prior restraint on freedom of expression, noting that the 
county board had unbridled discretion to grant or deny the 
permit. 
SUMMARY 
The majority opinion in Renton directs courts to give more 
deference to the "reasonable" decisions of government officials 
when they place restrictions on adult businesses. Cities now 
have no need to conduct their own studies on the effects of 
adult businesses in their community, but may rely on the ex­
periences of other cities that are reasonably related to their 
own conditions. Cities may also preclude adult businesses, 
particularly adult theaters, from using existing facilities and 
restrict their location to outlying areas, so long as the restricted 
area is reasonably capable of being developed for adult­
business use. Renton thus appears to signal a major change in 
the courts' treatment of adult-business ordinances. We should 
now expect to see far less judicial hostility toward ordinances 
that place significant restrictions on such businesses, although 
the courts do remain free to strike down ordinances that are 
vague, create a system of prior restraints on speech, or restrict 
adult businesses to such an extent that it cannot reasonably be 
said that this form of expression has not been effectively 
banned. 
13. The basic problem with the definitions was that they failed to 
distinguish between the commercial display and sale of sexually oriented ma­
terial in adult businesses and the presence of such materials in dwellings, of­
fices, or institutions. See Purple Onion v. Jackson, 511F.Supp.1207 (N.D. 
Ga. 1981), 34 ZD 7. 
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